Strategy and paradoxes of borda count in Formula 1 racing

Brien Kaiser

Abstrakt


Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1, and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.

Słowa kluczowe


social preferences, Borda count, voting paradoxes, social choice, Formula 1

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Bibliografia


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124

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