Marek M. Kamiński - „Ordynacje większościowe i jow-y. Kompendium reformatora ordynacji wyborczej”

Wojciech Rafałowski

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Bibliografia


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.80

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