Gry przetargu ultymatywnego

Marcin Malawski, Jaideep Roy

Abstrakt


Praca zawiera przegląd wyników eksperymentalnych dotyczących gry przetargu-ultymatywnego i gier pokrewnych. Obserwowane w eksperymentach postępowanie graczy w tej grze zasadniczo odbiega od przewidywań teorii gier, formułowanych dla zachowania racjonalnych graczy w racjonalnym otoczeniu. Ponieważ gra jest bardzo prosta, rozbieżność ta nie jest skutkiem kłopotów graczy z analizą strategiczną gry. Przedstawiamy w sposób krytyczny inne możliwe wyjaśnienia tej rozbieżności, w szczególności postępowanie dyktowane poczuciem sprawiedliwości i reakcje emocjonalne. Opisujemy także badania eksperymentalne nad wpływem parametrów gry (wielkości wypłat, opcji zewnętrznych itp.) oraz zewnętrznych czynników (np. narodowości) na decyzje podejmowane przez graczy.

Słowa kluczowe


podział, oferta, przetarg ultymatywny, dyktat, równowaga doskonała, sprawiedliwość, altruizm, informacja.

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